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In this paper we develop a measure of current ￿expenditures￿on housing
services for owner-occupiers. Having such a measure is important for mea-
suring the relative welfare of households, especially when comparing renters
and owners and for measuring in￿ ation. From a theoretical perspective ex-
penditures equal the ￿shadow price" of housing services (the marginal rate of
substitution between housing services and non-durable consumption) multi-
plied by the quantity of housing services consumed. In an idealised world, two
simple measures of the shadow price are available; the user cost of housing
capital and the rental price of an equivalent rental house. However, imperfect
capital markets, risk aversion, the tax system, moving costs and systematic
di⁄erences between houses available in the rental and owner-occupied sectors
drive a wedge between the shadow price of housing and these other two mea-
sures. This paper contributes to previous research by calibrating a lifecycle
model of housing investment and consumption to data from the UK Fam-
ily Expenditure Survey and by developing measures of the shadow price of
housing that take into account uncertainty in house prices, interest rates and
incomes, dynamic life cycle choices, and liquidity constraints taht depend on
both income and house value.
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Housing is extremely important both as a consumption good and as an asset.
It is the most important asset for a large majority of households (other than
human capital and pension wealth). In 2002, 70% of British households in
the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS) sample owned their house. In 2000,
housing wealth made up 80% of the non-pension wealth of households in
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) sample. The housing stock also
represents a large component of the national capital stock, accounting for
57% of the total value of the UK net capital stock at the end of 20031.
As a consumption good, housing is also very important. For renters in
the private rental sector, housing expenditures averaged 33% percent of the
household budget in the 2002 FES sample. For renters in the social housing
sector, these expenditures averaged 15% percent of the household budget2.
For homeowners with mortgages outstanding, direct housing expenditures
(mortgage payments, DIY expenditures, repairs and insurance) averaged
25% percent in the 2002 FES sample. For homeowners with no mortgage
outstanding, the equivalent ￿gure was 13%. These spending measures, how-
ever, are not proper measures of housing consumption for homeowners, since
they con￿ ate housing investment and housing consumption and neglect the
opportunity cost of equity invested.
This last point raises a crucial issue. For owner-occupiers, how should
current ￿expenditures￿on housing services be measured? From a theoretical
welfare economics perspective, the answer is clear. Expenditures equal the
￿shadow price" of housing services (the marginal rate of substitution between
housing services and non-durable consumption) multiplied by the quantity
of housing services consumed. In an idealised world, two simple measures of
the shadow price are available. One is the user cost of housing capital. The
other is the rental price of an equivalent rental house. However, imperfect
capital markets, risk aversion, the tax system and moving costs drive a wedge
between the shadow price of housing and the user cost of housing. These
factors and systematic di⁄erences between houses available in the rental and
owner-occupied sectors, drive a wedge between rents and the shadow price.
Rental equivalence is particularly untenable in the UK. Quality di⁄erences
1O¢ ce for National Statistics http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=479
2Housing bene￿t is a non-cash bene￿t for these households and is therefore not treated
as discretionary expenditure. If imputed housing bene￿t is added to expenditure then the
budget share of housing for social renters becomes 34%.
1between rental and owner occupied housing are stark. The private rental
market makes up only 8.5% of the entire housing market and the overlap is
small. The rest of the rental market, 24% of the housing market as a whole,
is made up of social housing. Thus, in real world housing markets, neither
of the commonly used methods provide valid estimates of the shadow price
of housing and expenditures on housing services by owner-occupiers.
Measuring the shadow price of housing correctly requires an understand-
ing of consumer demand for housing as an asset and as a consumption good,
but, despite its importance, research in this area has been limited by com-
putational and data problems. Until recently, the role of housing as an asset
has only been studied in very simple models with two periods, in models with
limited uncertainty, or in models with simple closed form solutions (Poterba
(1992), Nordvik (2001), Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2002)). Empirical work
has focused on testing some implications of housing models and impacts of
housing price shocks and volatility without studying the full properties of
lifecycle housing demand models (Muellbauer and Murphy (1997), Campbell
and Cocco (2003), Attanasio, Blow, Hamilton, and Leicester (2004), Banks et
al. (2004), Disney et al. (2004)). More recent theoretical work has begun to
address these issues in realistic lifecycle models of housing demand (Campbell
and Cocco (2007), Li and Yao (2007), and D￿az and Luengo-Prado (2007)).
Yet, this work has only begun and the interaction of housing demand with
consumption, savings, and insurance is only little understood.
This paper contributes to this line of research by calibrating a lifecycle
model of housing investment and consumption to data from the Family Ex-
penditure Survey (FES) and by developing measures of the shadow price of
housing that take into account uncertainty in house prices, interest rates and
incomes, dynamic life cycle choices, and liquidity constraints that depend on
both income and house value. Previous research has ignored variability in
interest rates and has ignored the income related liquidity constraint. Our
research makes use of sophisticated computational methods for approxima-
tion, numerical integration, and dynamic programming using splines in four
dimensions to approximate the optimal value function of households. We use
these methods and the data described above to analyse how the shadow price
of housing services depends not only on current housing market conditions
and household demographics but also on the levels and volatility of future
prices, interest rates, borrowing constraints, and income.
Developing a good measure of homeowners￿expenditures on housing ser-
vices is crucial for many welfare and policy questions. It is important for mea-
2suring the relative welfare of households, especially when comparing renters
and owners. It is also important for analysing consumer expenditure on
other goods. Nondurable consumption expenditures are not independent of
housing expenditures. For example, expenditures on services such as heating
and electricity are most obviously interrelated with the quantity of housing
services consumed. Failure to take these relationships into account can lead
to misinterpretations of data on nondurable consumption expenditures.
Proper measurements of expenditures on housing services are also essen-
tial for measuring in￿ ation. In the UK, the RPI includes an estimate of
average mortgage interest payments plus an estimated house depreciation
component as a measure of housing costs for owner occupiers, whereas the
US CPI uses the rent for an equivalent rental property. These methods are
adequate for many purposes and give useful and timely results without hav-
ing to fully model the consumer￿ s dynamic problem. But they are severely
￿ awed as measures of housing expenditure. The former does not equal the
shadow price of housing except in very special circumstances. The latter is
plagued with error when, as is the case in the UK, it is di¢ cult to identify
an equivalent rental property. To properly measure the cost of living or of
purchasing a ￿xed basket of goods and services, one needs to use the shadow
price of housing services.
In this paper, we use data from the FES to calibrate a computational life-
cycle model of the demand for housing and non-durable consumption with
uncertain housing prices, interest rates, and income and with liquidity con-
straints. We compute shadow prices of housing for di⁄erent demographic
groups distinguished by age, income, family structure, and education, using
the FES data. Finally we use the computed shadow prices to calculate mea-
sures of housing expenditure for owner occupiers in di⁄erent demographic
groups.
2 Model
A household has initial total wealth wt: The size of the household at time t
is nt: We assume nt evolves deterministically. The household faces exogenous
stochastic price processes qt = (pt;rt;yt) for all t = 1;:::;T + 1 where pt is
the housing price, yt is the labour income price, and rt is the gross interest
rate earned on bank savings. Given these exogenous factors, the household
chooses non-durable consumption ct; housing quantity ht; and bank savings
3st for t = 1;:::;T to maximise utility. The household is liquidity constrained
in that
st ￿ ￿by0 ￿ by1yt
st ￿ ￿bh0 ￿ bh1ptht
and wt ￿ wL
t :3 De￿ne v (wt;qt;t) as the value of the maximised utility. at
period t given realised values of the state variables (wt;qt): This function
satis￿es
v (wt;qt;t) = (1)
max
fst;ct;htg
￿
u(ct;ht;nt) + ￿
Z
v (wt+1;qt+1;t + 1)f (qt+1 jqtj)dqt+1
￿
subject to 8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
ct + st + ptht = wt
wt+1 = rt+1st + yt+1 + pt+1ht
st ￿ ￿by0 ￿ by1yt
st ￿ ￿bh0 ￿ bh1ptht
rH
t+1st + yL
t+1 + pL
t+1ht ￿ wL
t+1
ct;ht ￿ 0
9
> > > > > > =
> > > > > > ;
:
The ￿rst constraint is the ￿within-period" budget constraint. Within a
period, total expenditure on consumption, savings and housing must equal
total resources. The second is the investment return equation. Period t + 1
assets equal savings multiplied by gross interest plus income plus the value of
the house. The ￿nal inequality constraint is the ￿no bankruptcy￿constraint.
This constraint changes over time and requires that the value of total wealth
be large enough to ￿nance a minimum consumption level even in the worst
of all possible worlds.
We assume that
u(ct;ht;nt) =
n
￿￿
t
￿
c￿
t h
1￿￿
t
￿
￿t
￿t
and
v (wT+1;qT+1;T + 1) =
w
￿T+1
T+1
￿T+1
:
3This last constraint is a feasibility constraint. In theory, because we assume
limc!0
@u(c;h)
@c = 1: In practice, it sometimes binds due to numerical approximation errors.
42.1 Prices
Previous authors have allowed for stochastic real house prices and incomes
but not for stochastic real interest rates. However, Figures 1 and 2 below
show that both real house prices and real interest rates are stochastic. We
model the joint evolution of house prices, interest rates and incomes as an
VAR(1) with drift after a suitable transformation. Let zt 2 R3 and let
zt = At + ￿zt￿1 + "t where "t ￿ N (￿";￿"): We de￿ne
pt = p
H
￿
pL + exp(z1
t)
pH + exp(z1
t)
￿
(2)
so that
z
1
t = ln
￿
pt ￿ pL
pH ￿ pt
￿
+ lnp
H:
While zt is an AR(1) process, the price is constrained to a compact set.
Similarly,
rt = r
H
￿
rL + exp(z2
t)
rH + exp(z2
t)
￿
(3)
yt = y
H
￿
yL + exp(z3
t)
yH + exp(z3
t)
￿
: (4)
In summary the vector zt follows a VAR(1). The prices in the economy,
(pt;rt;yt) are nonlinear transformations of zt: This transformation has the ad-
vantages that 1) (pt;rt;yt) lie in a compact set if the minimum and maximum
prices are ￿nite and 2) the transformation nests the log transformation as
a special case (pL = rL = yL = 0 and pH = rH = yH = 1): That is, in this
latter special case (lnpt;lnrt;lnyt) = zt follows an VAR(1). We estimate the
parameters of the process zt = At + ￿zt￿1 + "t using FES data as described
in Section 3.5.
3 Baseline calibration
We ￿rst calibrate the model using data from the UK economy and parameter
values taken from the literature.
53.1 Preference parameters
The three utility parameters in the model are ￿; the consumption share of
expenditure in the within period utility function, ￿u; one minus the coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion, and ￿; the discount factor. We use ￿ = 0:8 as a
baseline ￿gure for the housing share of the within period budget. Li and Yao
(2007) use ￿ = 0:8 for their model of the US economy. For the coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion, we follow Li and Yao (2007); Campbell and Cocco
(2007), and D￿az and Luengo-Prado (2007) and use ￿ = ￿1 (i.e. 1￿￿ = 2):
For the discount factor, we follow Campbell and Cocco (2007) and use ￿ =
0:98: We set the marginal value of bequests equal to 0:6:
3.2 Demographics
Households begin life at age 20 and live until 82. Each period in the model
represents one year. We simulated the model once for each education group
e 2 f0;1g and for each cohort c = f1900;1910;:::;1980g: In the model, we
assume that the household size of each cohort group follows a deterministic
lifecycle path. For each group, we estimate the lifecycle path of household
size as follows.
Using the FES, for each education group, we predict the number of adults
per household using the regression equation
lnn1 =
2 X
i=1
2 X
j=1
￿ijt
iy
i + "
where t is the age of the head of household and y is the year of birth. For
each cohort and education group, we then compute the group average of n1.
The number of children per household is predicted from a multinomial logit
in which the utility of having k children is
vk =
2 X
i=1
2 X
j=1
￿
k
ijt
iy
i + "k
for k = 0;:::;9: Then, for each cohort and for each education group household
size at age t is calculated as
nt = n1t + 0:5n2t
6where n1t is the average predicted number of adults in the cohort at age t
and n2t is the average predicted number of children.
The time pro￿les of predicted household size are displayed in Figures 5 -
8. The pro￿les are hump shaped, peak in middle age, and mostly range from
1 to 3. Moreover, the older cohorts have larger household sizes. All pro￿les
appear reasonable except possibly for the 1900 and 1910 cohorts with low
education and age less than 60. Both cohorts have large predicted household
sizes at young ages and a big hump at age 50. The sizes predicted for young
ages are pure extrapolations to regions outside the support of the data. The
humps at age 50 partly represent a post-war baby boom but also are based on
limited data and are not reliable. However, the simulations do not use these
age ranges for these cohorts so these values have no impact on the results.
3.3 Liquidity constraints
Campbell and Cocco (2007) and D￿az and Luengo-Prado (2007) impose a
down-payment constraint. Li and Yao (2007) require mortgages to be repaid
according to a ￿xed schedule unless the household remortgages. Neither
studies the impact of the additional constraint that borrowing is limited by
household income.
In the UK mortgage market, lenders set limits on borrowing based on
both income and house value. However, many lenders set di⁄erent limits
depending on the interest rate charged. Moreover, the limits vary across
mortgage lenders. Especially in the 1990￿ s and after 2000, a borrower who
was unable to secure a su¢ ciently large mortgage from one lender, could
often ￿nd another lender who would lend more at a higher rate of interest.
Tables A.3 and A.4 provide some evidence from the Survey of Mortgage
Lenders on the ratios of mortgage advance to income and to house value
for 1990 to 2001. During this period, 75% of mortgage advances were less
than about 2.75 times total income and 90% were less than about 3.10 times
total income. At the same time, 75% of mortgage advances were less than
0.95 times house value and 90% were less than 0.965 times house value. The
tables show that the precise quantiles vary across years. They also show that
some borrowers borrow up to (even more than) 3.5 times income and that
some borrow more than the value of their house. As a baseline, scenario
we simulate the model with by0 = 0; by1 = 3:5 and bh0 = 0:1; bh1 = 0:8:
Households may borrow at most 3.5 times income and 0.8 times the house
value. The parameter bh0 = 0:1 allows for a small amount of unsecured debt
7such as credit card debt.
3.4 Initial wealth
The FES does not contain information on household wealth. For each cohort,
we calibrate 1992 wealth so that the average house value predicted by the
model for 1992 to 1999 equals the average house value from the FES for the
cohort for the same period. For 1992-1999 the FES contains information
about the purchase price of the house purchased so that we can compute the
average house value. Detailed values are displayed in Table A.5
3.5 Price processes
We want to estimate a time series process for qt = (pt;rt;yt) as an input for
the model. To maintain computational tractability and impose structure on
the data and the model we assume that these random variables have compact
support. Let qi
t 2
￿
qiL
t ;qiH
t
￿
: Then de￿ne
z
i
t = ln
￿
qi
t ￿ qiL
qiH ￿ qi
t
￿
+ lnq
iH
for i 2 f1;2;3g. e.g.
z
1
t = ln
￿
pt ￿ pL
pH ￿ pt
￿
+ lnp
H:
now zt 2 R3:
We transform the raw data on qt using this transformation and then
estimate the following AR(1) process for zt:
zt = At + ￿zt￿1 + "t (5)
where "t ￿ N (0;￿"), At is a deterministic time trend in transformed prices
which we have set to be quadratic, i.e.
At = a0 + a1t + a2t
2;
￿ is a 3￿3 matrix re￿ ecting the in￿ uence of lagged prices on current period
prices. We currently assume that the income process is independent of the
house price and interest rate process.
8For the house price and interest rate data we use quarterly data from
197201 to 200503, i.e. t = 1;:::;135 to estimate (5). Figures 1 and 2 show
the actual and predicted series for these data.
Real house prices display low short term volatility but have large low fre-
quency movements. Peaks occurred in 1974, 1981, 1990, and 2004. Troughs
occurred in 1978, 1982 and 1995. Real prices rose more than 30% from 1972
to 1974, nearly 100% from 1986 to 1990, and 100% from 1995 to 2004. Prices
fell 25% from 1974 to 1978 and 25% from 1990 to 1995.
Interest rates showed much more volatility over the period. In the 1970￿ s
real interest rates ￿ uctuated dramatically ranging from a low of 0.84 in 1976
to a high of 1.03 toward the end of the decade. These swings were closely
associated with large ￿ uctuations in in￿ ation rates. In the 1980￿ s, real rates
continued to display high frequency volatility but with much smaller ampli-
tudes. This volatility declined further in the 1990￿ s. This picture indicates
that short term interest rate ￿ uctuations are an important feature of the
economic environment in which households make investment decisions.
For the income data we use quarterly average data from 1978 to 2003 for
the each cohort c 2 f1900;:::;1980g.4 We estimated one income process for
each cohort and for each education type. To conserve space, we only display
the results for the 1940 cohort. The predicted and actual income processes
are displayed in Figure 3. The ￿gure shows the actual and predicted time
series for those with only compulsory education (￿low ed￿ ) and those with
post-compulsory education (￿high ed￿ ). For both groups, income displays a
￿hump" shape over the lifecycle. The volatility in the ￿gures indicates the
time series volatility of the average in the population. We assume that income
shocks are idiosyncratic and that therefore the individual level variance is
simply the sample size multiplied by the variance of the population average.
4 Shadow price of housing
The shadow price of housing is the price of housing services that would lead a
consumer who could separately purchase housing services and a housing asset
to consume the same amount of housing services as the consumer who pur-
chases the bundled product. If (ct;ht) are the optimal choices of a consumer
4We de￿ne cohort c to be the group of people with date of birth d 2 [c;c + 10): That
is, the cohort c = 1940; is the set of people born between 1940 and 1950.
9solving problem (1); then the shadow price ￿t satis￿es
￿t =
uh (ct;ht)
uc (ct;ht)
(6)
where uh and uc are the derivatives of the utility function with respect to h
and c:
De￿ne ￿yt and ￿ht to be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the
liquidity constraints in problem (1): The ￿rst order conditions from (1) give
the shadow price ￿t as
￿t = pt
0
B B
@1 ￿
￿
Z
pt+1
pt
@V (wt+1;qt+1;t+1)
@w f (qt+1 jqt)dqt+1 + ￿htbh
￿
Z
rt+1
@V (wt+1;qt+1;t+1)
@w f (qt+1 jqt)dqt+1 + ￿yt + ￿htbh
1
C C
A: (7)
Even when the liquidity constraints are not binding (i.e., the household does
not want to borrow more) so ￿ht = ￿yt = 0; this formula does not equal
the user cost of housing capital. The shadow price in period t depends on
the current price of housing, the covariance of capital gains
￿
pt+1
pt
￿
with the
marginal utility of wealth, and the covariance of the interest rate with the
marginal utility of wealth. The shadow price in (7) (and the associated
value function) can be used to predict housing market behaviour and to
measure the impacts on household welfare of changes in the housing market
environment.
The shadow price only equals the user cost if consumers are risk neutral
or if both interest rates and housing prices are deterministic. In these special
circumstances, the user cost equals the shadow price which equals
￿t = pt
0
B B
@1 ￿
Z ￿
pt+1
pt
￿
f (qt+1 jqt)dqt+1
Z
rt+1f (qt+1 jqt)dqt+1
1
C C
A:
The numerator is the expected capital gains. The denominator is the ex-
pected rate of return on ￿nancial assets. The user cost can be negative if
expected capital gains are large enough. Assuming deterministic prices, this
expression becomes
￿t = pt
￿
rt+1 ￿ gt+1
rt+1
￿
(8)
10where gt+1 = pt+1=pt.
Typically, empirical estimates of the user cost start with (8); measure rt+1
using a weighted average of the mortgage interest rate, im
t+1, and an interest
rate forgone on equity, ie
t+1, add in￿ ation ￿t+1; income taxes ￿t+1; a council
tax rate ct; and depreciation, dt to obtain an expression such as:
￿t = pt
￿
￿ti
m
t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿t)
￿
i
e
t+1 (1 ￿ ￿t+1) ￿ ￿t+1￿t+1
￿
+ ct + dt ￿ gt+1
￿
(9)
where ￿t is the average mortgage advance divided by the house value.5
To show why the user cost is not useful for understanding housing market
behaviour, we calculated the user cost in equation (9) for the UK using the
Treasury bill rate, the Nationwide house price index, the Halifax mortgage
interest rate and price data from the RPI. Figure 4 shows the results.
Between 1974-2002, the user cost ￿ uctuated dramatically in response to
changing real interest and capital gains rates. Peaks of £13,805, £3,939
and £12,124 were reached in 1974, 1980, and 1990. These corresponded to
periods with high interest rates and/or low expected capital gains. Troughs
of -£7,117, -£1,888, and -£15,244 were reached in 1976, 1986, and 2002,
corresponding to episodes of high expected capital gains and/or low real
interest rates.
If the user cost were equal to the shadow price of housing, households
should have bought unlimited quantities of housing in the troughs where
user cost was negative. Obviously, housing purchases were limited. Why?
For two main reasons. Firstly, households were liquidity constrained ￿the
amount they could borrow to purchase a house was limited. As can be seen in
equation (7), when liquidity constraints are binding the Lagrange multipliers
create a di⁄erence between the user cost and the shadow price. Secondly,
future housing prices were uncertain. It would have been impossibly risky to
buy arbitrarily large quantities of housing. This additional factor can lead
the shadow price to be positive even when the user cost is negative. The user
cost alone cannot predict consumer housing purchase behaviour nor measure
￿ uctuations in welfare related to housing. What is required is the shadow
price.
After calibrating our model, we discuss simulated shadow prices in Section
5.4.
5The expression depends on in￿ ation because of the interaction between the income tax,
in￿ ation, and the opportunity cost of equity. The time subscripts re￿ ect our assumptions
about timing.
115 Results
Given the baseline parameters described, the model predicts household opti-
mal choices of (st;ht) as functions of (wt;pt;rt;yt;t): These functions are
ht = ￿1 (wt;pt;rt;yt;t)
st = ￿2 (wt;pt;rt;yt;t):
In fact, the model produces one pair of functions for each cohort and for
each education group. These policy functions describe the optimal choices of
housing investment and savings as functions of beginning of period wealth,
the price of housing, the interest rate, income and time. The model also
predicts
ut = v (wt;pt;rt;yt;t)
￿t = ￿(wt;pt;rt;yt;t)
where (ut;￿t) are the utility level obtained and the shadow price of housing
and (v,￿) are the value function and the shadow price function predicted by
the model. We discuss each of these functions in the following sections.
5.1 Policy functions, welfare and shadow prices
It is not possible to display or describe these functions in full detail. Instead
we discuss the policy functions, the value function and shadow prices for the
1940 cohort with high education at age 42 (t=23 in our model and calendar
year 1987.) Given ￿xed values of income and the interest rate (both ￿xed
at the mean levels), the dependence of these functions on wealth and prices
are displayed in Figures 9-12. Figure 9 displays the consumption function,
Figure 10 the housing function, Figure 11 the value function and Figure 12
the shadow price of housing. All pictures display wealth on the horizontal axis
measured in units of £100,000. That is, one unit of wealth equals £100,000.
Figure 9 shows how consumption varies with wealth and current house
price. The ￿gures show that consumption increases from £10,000 when
wealth is £13,000 to about £22,000 when wealth is about £50,000. The
picture shows that large increases in house prices have very small impacts on
consumption demand when wealth is small (<£50,000) but larger impacts
when wealth is large (>£50,000). In the latter case, increases in the house
price increases consumption demand. Note that pictures show the e⁄ect of
12house price changes holding (nominal) wealth constant where wealth includes
the value of owner occupied housing. Thus they allow for an ordinary income
e⁄ect (due to the price change) but not for an endowment income (or wealth)
e⁄ect. In an analogous way Figure 10 show the e⁄ects of wealth and prices
on housing demand. In this case, housing demand increases strongly with
wealth and decreases strongly with price. Again these house price e⁄ects
contain no wealth e⁄ects.
Several in￿ uences underlie these results. First, when house prices in-
crease, there is a substitution e⁄ect. People want to consume more con-
sumption and less housing. Second, because of the assumptions on the house
price process, when housing prices are low, the expected return on housing is
high. People want to own more housing when house prices are low and less
housing when they are high. Third, because of liquidity constraints, when
house prices are low, a household must purchase a large house to borrow
from the future. When prices are high, a smaller house purchase is su¢ cient
for the same quantity of borrowing. The combination of these three forces
explains the house price e⁄ects.
5.2 Welfare and shadow prices
The results from the model can also be used to calculate the welfare impacts
on households of changes in wealth, prices, interest rates and income. One
can also study the shadow price of housing (the marginal utility valuation of
one additional unit of housing).
Figure 11 records the value function as a function of prices and wealth
conditional on ￿xed values of the interest rate and income. Figure 12 displays
the shadow price of housing as a function of prices and wealth, again with the
interest rate and income ￿xed. The value function is an increasing, strongly
concave function of wealth and a decreasing function of the current house
price. The imapct of house prices on welfare are small for household with
the lowest wealth, stronger for the households with high wealth, and strongest
for households with wealth between about £5,000 and £20,000. Again, these
house price e⁄ects strip out any wealth e⁄ects and measure the net impact
of house prices on utility due to: the increased cost of the housing good;
the relaxed constraint on borrowing, and; impacts of current price on beliefs
about future asset returns and risks.
The shadow price of housing is given by equation (7): Figure 12 shows
the shadow price for this cohort. The shadow price is an increasing function
13of the current housing price. The e⁄ect of prices is stronger when wealth
is low and is much stronger when wealth is very low ( less than £10,000 or
£20,000). The shadow price is also a decreasing, convex function of wealth.
When wealth is larger than about £45,000 it is ￿ at. When wealth is less than
10 or 20,000, the magnitude of the slope increases dramatically.
5.3 Lifeycle simulations
What do these results imply for aggregate time series of consumption, hous-
ing, and wealth or for the dynamics of household welfare and of the shadow
price of housing? To answer these questions, we used our model to simulate
an economy with 1000 agents each facing one of ten di⁄erent regional price
series. From this simulated economy we then simulated lifeycle paths of con-
sumption, housing and wealth and of household welfare and the shadow price
of housing.
Figures 13 - 44 display lifecycle pro￿les for each cohort and for each
education group. For each group, we show the mean and distribution of
simulated wealth, housing demand, consumption demand, utility, and the
shadow price for the period 1990 to 2007 as well. For example, Figures
29-32 display results for the 1940 cohort with both low and high education
from model period 26 to 46 (that is age 45 - 65 and for years 2010). In
the simulated data, average wealth for both groups increased from near zero
to £100,000. The spread between the 10% quantile and the 90% quantile
of the welath distribution ranges from about £50,000 to about £150,000 for
the low education group and from about £80,000 to £200,000 for the high
education group. At the same time, average housing demand is hump-shaped
and consumption grows from less than £20,000 to more than £50,000. This
growth in wealth and consumption implicitly assumes that these households
forecast a large part of the house price growth of this period.
Similar patterns can be seen in the depicted pro￿les for the other cohorts.
5.4 Shadow prices and expenditure
We can used either (6) or (7) to calculate the shadow price. Equation (6)
shows that it can be calculated directly using the parameters, optimal con-
14sumption and housing demand. Equation (6) can be written
￿t =
1 ￿ ￿
￿
ct
ht
=
1
4
ct
ht
:
Further housing expenditure is
e
h
t = ￿tht
=
1
4
ct
The ￿rst things to notice about the shadow prices in the model are that they
are always positive and relatively stable within cohorts, across cohorts and
across the lifecycle. For all cohorts, the time series of shadow prices are of
the order of 0.2 and are relatively ￿ at over the lifeycycle. They seem to be
somewhat higher for the younger cohorts at young ages and for the older
cohorts at older ages. Also, there is much more variability in the shadow
prices for both younger cohorts and older cohorts. Both of these latter e⁄ects
are due to binding constraints being more important for these groups.
The pro￿les of housing expenditures are simply 25% of the consumption
pro￿le. The younger cohorts consumption and housing expenditure is much
more volatile.
5.5 Parameter impacts
We also studied how changes in the parameters a⁄ect the results. Key drivers
of the results in the model include household beliefs about the house, price,
and income processes and the parameters of the liquidity constraints. To in-
vestigate the importance of the parameters we also computed results for three
alternative models. The di⁄erences from the baseline model are described in
Table 1.
Table 1:
Alternative models
Model Description Question
A Eliminate trend growth in house price process. Impact of beliefs on house prices?
B Loose liquidity constraints (by1 = 5; bh1 = 0:95) Impact of relaxed liquidity constraints?
C Tight liquidity constraints (by1 = 2:5; bh1 = 0:5) Impact of tight liquidity constraints?
15In Model A, we eliminate the trend growth rate in housing prices. This
results in signi￿cantly lower values of expected house price growth. There still
is some expected house price growth because the house price is an exponential
function of a shock. We report results of this experiment for the 1940 Cohort,
High Education group. Results of this experiment are summarised in Figures
45 and 46. These can be compared with the baseline results for this group in
Figures 31 and 32. As one would expect, the growth in wealth in this model
is much smaller. Also, cross-sectional variability in wealth is much smaller.
Also housing consumption in the low growth model is roughly half as large
as housing consumption in the baseline model. In terms of welfare, utility is
higher in the high expected house price growth world.
In Model B, we investigate the impact of relaxed liquidity constraints.
A summary of these results is shown in Figures 47 and 48. With relaxed
constraints, household wealth grows much more quickly. The median level
reaches £150,000 by model period 32 versus £110,000 in the baseline model.
After that, median and 90% quantile wealth levels remain higher throughout
life. Much of this increased wealth is supported by larger investment in
housing than the baseline model and in turn supports a higher consumption
level than the baseline model. Also, the cross sectional variation in housing
consumption is much larger in Model B than in the baseline model. Figure 50
displays the impact on utility and on the shadow price. Utility is signi￿cantly
higher in the model with relaxed constraints as one would expect. This
di⁄erence diminishes near the end of life. Also the cross-sectional variation
of utility is higher than the baseline model. For the shadow price, the shadow
price is somewhat lower at young ages. But then the 90% quantile increases
dramatically at older ages as the fraction who are constrained increases.
Results from Model C are displayed in Figures 49 and 50. The di⁄erences
from the baseline model are less stark but are visible. Average investment in
housing is higher in model C at younger ages. Larger quantities are required
to borrow than in the baseline model. The cross-sectional variation in housing
consumption is also larger at young ages. Those who are more constrained are
likely to invest more in housing in order to borrow. The impact on utility
is unclear. Everything else equal, tight constraints cannot increase ex ant
utility however, could lead to ex post higher utility is household behaviour
is forced to be more conservative.
166 Conclusion
In this paper we calibrate a lifecycle model of demand for housing. The
model has stochastic house prices, interest rates, and incomes along with
constraints on borrowing that depend on household income and on the house
value. The model is calibrated to parameters from the literature and to
data from the UK FES/EFS. We use the model to study how demand for
housing and consumption as well as the welfare depend on wealth, house
prices, interest rates, income, age and birth cohort. We also use the model
to estimate shadow prices for housing.
We ￿nd that house prices (excluding endowment income e⁄ects) have
small impacts on consumption but that wealth impacts on consumption are
signi￿cant. Both house price impacts and wealth impacts on housing demand
are signi￿cant. The shadow price of housing is an increasing function of house
prices. The impact is stronger when wealth is low.
We also simulate lifecycle pro￿les for 18 groups, 9 cohorts and 2 educa-
tion groups per cohort. The model produces reasonable lifecycle pro￿les of
consumption and housing demand.
We ￿nd that reduced expectations about house price growth reduce in-
vestment in housing and reduce the rate of wealth accumulation. We also
￿nd that either tightening or loosening liquidity constraints have impacts on
housing, wealth and utility as one would expect.
Much work remains to be done to improve the modeling approach. First,
more work can be done to ￿t the model to data. Our work in this dimen-
sion was limited by data quality and computational considerations. Sec-
ond, further investigations about alternative assumptions about the stochas-
tic processes driving the model are required. Finally, several features of
the housing market can be added to the model including transaction costs,
taxes, depreciation and maintenance, choice of rental vs. ownership., and
alternative assumptions about credit market conditions. These features can
be incorporated in the present model and o⁄er several promising avenues for
future work.
17A Tables
Table A.1:
Summary of notation
Variable Description
wt total wealth at t
ht quantity of housing at t
ct quantity of other consumption at t
st bank savings (or borrowing) at t
pt price of housing at t
rt gross interest rate at t
yt income at t
qt vector of (pt;rt;yt)
wL
t minimum feasible wealth level (see section 10 on bankruptcy)
18Table A.2:
Baseline Parameter Values
Parameter Symbol Value
Preferences
Curvature of utility ￿ -1
Marginal value of bequests ￿T 0.98
Discount rate ￿ 0.98
Consumption share ￿ 0.7
Liquidity constraints
Income constraint (1) by0 0
Income constraint (2) by1 3.5
House value constraint (1) bh0 0.1
House value constraint (2) bh1 0.8
19Table A.3:
Ratio of mortgage advance to income:
Quantiles
Year 75% 90% 95%
1990 2.74 3.2 3.62
1991 2.74 3.14 3.50
1992 2.72 3.06 3.26
1993 2.75 3.07 3.25
1994 2.78 3.12 3.28
1995 2.79 3.13 3.3
1996 2.6 3.04 3.27
1997 2.67 3.12 3.37
1998 2.68 3.13 3.4
1999 2.75 3.22 3.49
2000 2.77 3.26 3.54
2001 2.77 3.31 3.63
Note: Column 2 is the 75% quantile of the distribution of mortgage ad-
vances to total income. Column 3 is the 90% quantile. Column 4 is the 95%
quantile. The sample is all mortgages recorded in the Survey of Mortgage
Lenders 1990 to 2001.
20Table A.4:
Ratio of mortgage advance to house value:
Quantiles
Year 50% 75% 90% 95%
1990 .85 .960 1.00 1.00
1991 .85 .950 1.00 1.00
1992 .878 .950 .966 1.00
1993 .875 .950 .960 1.00
1994 .893 .950 .966 1.00
1995 .9 .950 .967 1.10
1996 .900 .950 .965 1.00
1997 .890 .950 .965 1.16
1998 .872 .950 .950 .971
1999 .852 .950 .950 .967
2000 .843 .949 .963 .972
2001 .741 .900 .950 .970
Note: Column 2 is the 50% quantile of the distribution of mortgage ad-
vances to total income. Column 3 is the 75% quantile. Column 4 is the 90%
quantile. Column 5 is the 95% quantile. The sample is all mortgages in the
Survey of Mortgage Lenders 1990 to 2001.
21Table A.5:
House values (1992 - 1999):
FES cohort averages
Cohort Education Age House value Calibrated wealth
1900 0 91 93,500 79,950
1900 1 91 162,000 177,000
1910 0 81 82,900 63,600
1910 1 81 127,000 125,000
1920 0 71 78,200 25,100
1920 1 71 123,000 73,000
1930 0 61 78,700 -16,600
1930 1 61 122,000 12,000
1940 0 51 81,500 -20,000
1940 1 51 125,000 -1,500
1950 0 41 080,200 -20,000
1950 1 41 113,000 -3,000
1960 0 31 71,200 -20,000
1960 1 31 90,400 -20,000
1970 0 21 57,400 92,500
1970 1 21 65,500 32,600
22B Computation
Let V (wt;qt;t) be the value function for a household in period t with wealth
wt facing prices qt where qt = (pt;rt;yt):6 That is, V measures the maximum
level of utility or welfare obtainable by a household when wealth is w and
prices are q in period t: Further let c(wt;qt;t); s(wt;qt;t); and h(wt;qt;t)
be the optimal policy functions of such a household. These describe optimal
choices of consumption, savings, and housing as functions of wealth, prices,
and time.
Our computational methods compute numerical approximations to these
four functions. Because the approximation technique for each of the four
functions is similar. We only detail approximation of the value function V:
We will approximate V with the function
b V (w;q;t) =
J X
j=1
aj (t)￿j (w;q)
where the functions ￿j (w;q) j = 1;:::;J are suitably chosen basis functions
(tensor products of univariate spline functions) and the coe¢ cients aj (t)
j = 1;:::;J are computed by solving the problem
min
fag
8
<
:
N X
i=1
!i
"
V (wi;qi;t) ￿
J X
j=1
aj (t)￿j (wi;qi)
#29
=
;
(10)
where f!ig
N
i=1 are appropriately chosen weights.
The following algorithm is used to compute these approximations.
1. Fix a grid (wi;qi) for i = 1;:::;N: Each point in this grid is an element
of R4:
2. Fix a set of basis functions ￿j (w;q) for j = 1;:::;J:
3. Set t = T:
4. For each i; set wT = wi and qT = qi and compute the solution to the
household￿ s period T problem: The result is a set of values for the value
function V (wi;qi;T):
6When there are no ￿xed costs, the value function does not depend on h explicitly.
235. Compute the coe¢ cients aj (T) that solve problem (10):
6. Set t = T ￿ 1:
7. For each i; set wT￿1 = wi and qT￿1 = qi and compute the solution to the
household￿ s period T ￿1 problem with b V (w;q;T) replacing V (w;q;T)
and with the integral computed by Gaussian quadrature techniques.
The result is a set of values for the value function V (wi;qi;T ￿ 1):
8. Compute the coe¢ cients aj (T ￿ 1) that solve problem (10):
This process is repeated for each period. In practice, values for the policy
functions are saved as well and the actual grid chosen varies with each period.
Additionally, our baseline model requires us to approximate a three di-
mensional integral. We approximate this using Gaussian quadrature. Ex-
tensions to the baseline model require approximation of a six dimensional
integral. Again we will use Gaussian quadrature to approximate these inte-
grals.
Compute code for this model is published can be found at
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26Figure 1
Actual and Predicted Real House Prices (2005q3 £100,000)
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27Figure 2
Actual and Predicted Real Gross Interest Rate
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29Figure 4
User cost of housing capital in Great Britain (2002£)
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Predicted household size: Older cohorts, compulsory education
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31Figure 6
Predicted household size: Younger cohorts, compulsory education
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32Figure 7
Predicted household size: Older cohorts, advanced education
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Predicted household size: Younger cohorts, advanced education
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34Figure 9
Optimal consumption: 1940 cohort, high education. One unit of wealth
of consumption equals £100,000.
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35Figure 10
Optimal housing: 1940 cohort, high education. One unit of wealth
equals £100,000.
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36Figure 11
Utility: 1940 cohort, high education. One unit of wealth equals
£100,000.
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37Figure 12
Shadow price: 1940 cohort, high education. One unit of wealth equals
£100,000.
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Wealth, housing and consumption: 1900 Cohort, Low Education
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Figure 14
Utility and the shadow price: 1900 Cohort, Low Education
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39Figure 15
Wealth, housing and consumption: 1900 Cohort, High Education
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Figure 16
Utility and the shadow price: 1900 Cohort, High Education
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40Figure 17
Wealth, housing and consumption: 1910 Cohort, Low Education
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Figure 18
Utility and the shadow price: 1910 Cohort, Low Education
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41Figure 19
Wealth, housing and consumption: 1910 Cohort, High Education
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Figure 20
Utility and the shadow price: 1910 Cohort, High Education
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Wealth, housing and consumption: 1920 Cohort, Low Education
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Figure 22
Utility and the shadow price: 1920 Cohort, Low Education
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43Figure 23
Wealth, housing and consumption: 1920 Cohort, High Education
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Figure 24
Utility and the shadow price: 1920 Cohort, High Education
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44Figure 25
Wealth, housing and consumption: 1930 Cohort, Low Education
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Figure 26
Utility and the shadow price: 1930 Cohort, Low Education
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Wealth, housing and consumption: 1930 Cohort, High Education
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Figure 28
Utility and the shadow price: 1930 Cohort, High Education
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Wealth, housing and consumption: 1940 Cohort, Low Education
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Figure 30
Utility and the shadow price: 1940 Cohort, Low Education
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47Figure 31
Wealth, housing and consumption: 1940 Cohort, High Education
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Figure 32
Utility and the shadow price: 1940 Cohort, High Education
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48Figure 33
Wealth, housing and consumption: 1950 Cohort, Low Education
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Figure 34
Utility and the shadow price: 1950 Cohort, Low Education
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49Figure 35
Wealth, housing and consumption: 1950 Cohort, High Education
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Figure 36
Utility and the shadow price: 1950 Cohort, High Education
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50Figure 37
Wealth, housing and consumption: 1960 Cohort, Low Education
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Figure 38
Utility and the shadow price: 1960 Cohort, Low Education
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51Figure 39
Wealth, housing and consumption: 1960 Cohort, High Education
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Figure 40
Utility and the shadow price: 1960 Cohort, High Education
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52Figure 41
Wealth, housing and consumption: 1970 Cohort, Low Education
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Figure 42
Utility and the shadow price: 1970 Cohort, Low Education
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53Figure 43
Wealth, housing and consumption: 1970 Cohort, High Education
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Figure 44
Utility and the shadow price: 1970 Cohort, High Education
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54Figure 45
Wealth, housing and consumption: 1940 Cohort, High Education, Low
Growth in House Prices
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Figure 46
Utility and shadow price: 1940 Cohort, High Education, Low Growth
in House Prices
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55Figure 47
Wealth, housing and consumption: 1940 Cohort, High Education,
Loose Constraints
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Figure 48
Utility and Shadow Price: 1940 Cohort, High Education, Loose
Constraints
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56Figure 49
Wealth, housing and consumption: 1940 Cohort, High Education,
Tight Constraints
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Figure 50
Utility and Shadow Price: 1940 Cohort, High Education, Tight
Constraints
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